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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the dynamic relationships between government revenues, government 
expenditures and economic growth in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain (PIIGS 
henceforth).  To this end we use a multivariate econometric model based on the Toda-Yamamoto 
(1995) procedure.  Our empirical results reveal a bidirectional relationship between government 
revenues and government expenditures in Portugal only.  Greece is the only county in which 
government expenditures Granger cause government revenues.  Therefore, there is no evidence 
for spend-and-tax hypothesis for three countries of our sample.  For Italy there is a unique 
unidirectional relationship running from government revenues to GDP while a unique 
unidirectional relationship was found running from government revenues to government 
expenditures for Ireland.  Results for Spain show a double bidirectional relationships running 
from government revenues to GDP and from government expenditures to GDP.  Moreover, there 
exists a unidirectional causal relationship between government revenues and government 
expenditures.  Again, there is no evidence for tax-and-spend hypothesis for three countries of our 
sample. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
he effect of fiscal policy on economic growth is an ambiguous and long-standing issue in both 
theoretical and empirical research. It is also of critical importance for policymakers as they actively 
use fiscal policies to correct externalities and ensure satisfactory provision of public goods and 
services.  Nevertheless, in practice, it is difficult to define the optimal policy because the reaction may differ from 
one country to another. 
 
During the past few decades, literature on public finance has distinguished various hypotheses to describe 
the relationship between government revenues and expenditures.  Those hypotheses can be classified into four 
categories
1
.  The first one is the tax-and-spend hypothesis proposed by Friedman (1978), Buchanan and Wagner 
(1978), which suggests that changes in revenues generate changes in expenditures.  The authors argued that 
increases of tax will generate an increase in expenditures.  The second assumption is the spend- and-tax hypothesis 
suggested by Peacock and Wiseman (1961, 1979) and Barro (1974) which reveals that changes in expenditures 
generates changes in revenues.  The third hypothesis is fiscal synchronization early developed by the work of 
Musgrave (1966) and later developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981).  This hypothesis assumes that government 
optimal fiscal policies rely on voters’ decision process outcomes concerning their demand for public services and 
their reactions toward income redistribution (Manage and Marlow 1986; Miller and Russek 1990; Owoye 1995).  
Finally, the fourth hypothesis is institutional separation developed by Baghestani and McNown (1994) which 
considers that government revenues and expenditures are independent from each other.  As there is no relationship 
between government revenues and expenditures, this hypothesis is characterized by non-causality in empirical 
terms. 
 
                                                          
1 For more details, see recent paper of Hamdi and Sbia (2013). 
T 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2013 Volume 29, Number 5 
1344 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
Literature on fiscal policy is abundant and results differ from one study to another.  For the US context, 
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) found that after a short increase in government spending, nondurable consumption 
decline slightly while durables consumption falls.  Fatás and Mihov (2001) show that increases in government 
expenditures are expansionary, but lead to important changes in the composition of GDP in the form of an increase 
in private investment that more than compensates for the fall in private consumption (Afonso and Ricardo 2009).  
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find that fiscal shocks have a positive effect on private consumption, and a negative 
impact on private investment.  Afonso and Ricardo (2009) investigated the macroeconomic effect of Fiscal policy on 
GDP; their results suggest that an expansion of government spending is associated to an episode of fiscal 
deterioration.  Similarly, an increase in government revenue is followed by a somewhat less disciplined fiscal policy. 
 
The 2008 financial turmoil and the ongoing sovereign debt crisis have renewed the interest of academia (i.e 
Kouretas and Vlamis (2010); Miroslav 2010, Hamdi and Sbia 2013), central bankers and governments in the role of 
fiscal policy.  This is because the crisis shows how mismanagement of fiscal policy can be devastating for the 
welfare of a country and how effective fiscal policy is crucial for sustainable economic development.  The current 
study enrich the available literature by exploring the dynamic relationships between government revenues, 
government expenditures and economic growth in PIIGS countries through the use of a multivariate causality 
framework based on the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) test, the so-called Modified-Wald test. 
 
The reminder of the paper is as follows: section three describes data and the methodology, section four 
analyses the empirical results while section five concludes. 
 
II. FISCAL POLICY AND GROWTH: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature on fiscal policy and economic growth is rich. The empirical research could be categorized in four 
axes.  The first one explores the effects of budget deficits and fiscal consolidation on growth.  Studies of this axe 
suggest that sustainable fiscal consolidation enforces investor confidence and creates budgetary resources for 
specific purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of the government’s financial position2, or the stability of 
the economy in the long-run.  Results of the first axe are interpreted as evidence of non-Keynesian effects during 
fiscal consolidation episodes.  Researchers have pointed to the experiences of Scandinavian countries where fiscal 
consolidations have been generated strong growth.  Some other cross-country studies based on many periods of 
large reductions in deficits demonstrate that fiscal adjustments are frequently associated with stronger-than average 
GDP growth.  For example, the study of Kumar et al. (2007) concludes that while fiscal consolidations tend to have 
short-run contractionary effects, they can be expansionary in the long-run.  The second axe examines the impact of 
the size of government on growth (where the size of the government is defined as the general government spending 
in proportion to GDP).  The idea is to show that an uncontrolled public spending could negatively affect growth and 
fiscal imbalances would lead to high levels of taxation and borrowing.  As a result investors will not have any 
incentive to investor or to innovate.  Uncontrolled public spending is an attraction for corrupted bureaucrats and free 
riders. Broadly, the relationship between government size and growth rates has received great deal of attention since 
the early 1990s, with the pioneering paper of Barro (1991b).  In his seminal paper, Barro extends the endogenous 
growth framework including tax-financed government services (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1992).  He concludes that 
government expenditure is positively linked to economic growth when the share of government expenditure (and 
consequently the tax rate) is low.  But then turns negative due to increasing inefficiencies as the share of expenditure 
increases (related to the disincentive effect of higher tax rates on private capital accumulation).  Thus, indicating a 
nonlinear relationship between government expenditure and growth (Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson 2010). These 
expenditures must be financed by two types of taxation: those (such as income taxes) that are distortionary with 
respect to investment decisions, including human capital investment, and taxes which do not distort investment 
decisions. The third axe focuses on the role of governance. The impact of fiscal policy on growth will depends on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy makers’ decisions and thus, the quality of their governance. The 
quality of governance and public institutions has a direct impact on public expenditures and thus on growth 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000, 2004).  Countries with better governance are generally able to collect taxes and spend 
public funds more efficiently and effectively.  Thus, higher spending in productive areas can lead to higher growth 
                                                          
2 See Giavazzi and Pagano 1990, Alesina and Perotti 1997; Alesina and Ardagna 1998; Perotti 1999, Miller and Russek 2003, 
Gupta et al 2005 
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in countries with strong governance, and higher spending in unproductive areas is not necessarily harmful to growth.  
In contrast, growth in countries with weak governance tends to be slowed by higher levels of unproductive spending 
and the higher taxes that are required to fund it, and they do not necessarily benefit from spending in areas that are 
typically considered productive (Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson. 2010).  Finally, the fourth axe analysis the impact 
of the composition of expenditures and taxes on growth.  Broadly, not all expenditures and methods of financing 
have the same impacts on economic growth.  Empirical evidence suggests that growth is very sensitive to the 
composition of expenditures.  Government spending that improves the quality and quantity of factors of production, 
enhances the quality of legal framework, reduces markets barriers highly increases growth.  In contrast, 
unproductive spending (defense, subsidies) may considerably hit growth. 
 
Since 2007, several developing and developing countries have been experiencing serious government 
budget deficits and their fiscal positions have been deteriorated substantially, reflecting declines in the level of GDP. 
Among these countries, PIIGS are on the top of the list.  As illustrates in Figure 1, central government debt (as 
percentage of GDP) has increased drastically since 2007 in PIIGS countries.  The debt to GDP ratio reached 110% 
in Italy and 140% in Greece in 2010. 
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Figure1. Evolution of Central Government Debt in PIIGS countries since 2003
(as % of GDP)
 
Source: Authors from WDI data 
 
The current crisis shows how misconduct of fiscal policy can threaten the welfare of a country and how 
crucial effective fiscal policy is for economic development. 
 
III. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
This study uses annual real GDP, real government spending (GE) and real government revenues (GR) time 
series data covering the 1995-2009 periods for PIIGS countries
3
.  All the data are taken from the Eurostat database, 
and the sample period is common for all countries. 
 
a. Unit Root Test 
 
To test for stationary of the series, we firstly, we employ an Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) unit root 
test.  The extended maintained regression used in the ADF test can be expressed in its most general form as follows: 
 
tjtj
p
j
tt tYYY   


1
1  (1) 
 
                                                          
3 This is the longest available time series at international databases (IMF, WDI, Eurostat, OECD) 
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where   is the drift term, t  denotes the time trend and p  is the largest lag length used. The null hypothesis H0: 
tY  is I(1), that is unit root, is rejected in favor of I(0) if   is found to be negative and statistically significantly 
different from zero.  Common criticisms of these tests include sensitivity to the way the test is conducted (size of 
test), such that the wrong version of the ADF test is used. ADF test are also relatively sensitive to any incorrect 
establishment of lag parameter. Furthermore, this test tends to under-reject the null hypothesis pointing at non-
stationarity too often. Consequently, to confirm the results of the ADF test a Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin 
(KPSS) test was also conducted. 
 
The KPSS statistic is based on the residuals from the OLS regression, which takes the following form: 
 
yt = β`Dt + μt + ut (2) 
 
μt = μt−1 + εt,   εt ∼ W N  (0,
 
2
 ) 
 
where Dt contains deterministic components (constant or constant plus time trend), ut is I(0) and μt may be 
heteroskedastic. Notice that is a pure random walk with innovation variance
2
 . The null hypothesis that yt is I(0) is 
formulated as H0: 
2
  = 0, which implies that μt is a constant. Although not directly apparent, this null hypothesis 
also implies a unit moving average root in the ARMA representation of Δyt. The KPSS test statistic is the Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) or score statistic for testing 
2
 = 0 against the alternative that 
2
 > 0 and is given by: 
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
  is the residual of a regression of yt on Dt and 
2ˆ  is a consistent estimate of the long-run 
variance of ut using tuˆ . Under the null that yt is I(0), Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin show that KPSS 
converges to a function of standard Brownian motion that depends on the form of the deterministic terms D t but not 
their coefficient values β. In particular, if Dt = 1 then 
 
drrVKPSS d )(
1
0
1  (4) 
 
where V1(r) = W(r) + rW(1) and W(r) is standard Brownian motion for r   [0,1]. If Dt = (1,t)` then 
 
drrVKPSS d )(
1
0
2  (5) 
 
where V2(r) = W(r) + r(2 - 3r) W(1)+ 6r(r
2
-1 ) drrV )(
1
0
2 . Critical values from the asymptotic distributions (4) and 
(5) must be obtained by simulation methods. 
 
The stationary test is a one-sided right-tailed test so that one rejects the null of stationarity at the 100 α % 
level if the KPSS test statistic (3) is greater than the 100 (1 − α) % quantile from the appropriate asymptotic 
distribution (4) or (5). 
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b. Toda-Yamamoto Procedure 
 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) propose a method that is used to estimate unrestricted VAR by the use of a 
Modified Wald test for restrictions on the parameters of the VAR (k) model and estimates a VAR [k+dmax], where 
k is the lag order of VAR and dmax is the maximal order of integration for the series in the system.  The procedure 
of causality test of Toda and Yamamato (1995) is expressed as follows: 
 
Let y t = (y t,1 ,…,y tp , )
'
 a vector constitutes of p variables and estimated by VAR (k+d max ), where d max  is 
the lag order of integration of the following variables: 
 
  T,…1,+) d+(k =   t ; e +y A +…+y A +y A +A  =y  (1) 
 
In equation (1) e t  is an i.i.d. sequence of n-dimensional random vectors with mean zero and covariance 
matrix 0  such that   0
2
, 

tieE  for some .0  
 
Equation (1) can be written as follows: 
 
 e + Ayl = y     ttt ,                    T ,…1,+ ) d+(k =   t  (2) 
 
where A is a matrix defined as   ) A… A  (A =A   
maxdk10 
and       )' y… y (1 = yl  )d(k-t
'
1-tt max
 
 
Let  y = (y 1max dk
 y 2max dk
…y T )         yl = (yl 1max dk  yl 2max dk …y Tl ) 
e = (e 1max dk
 e 2max dk
 ,e T ),  
 
Equation (2) became as follows: 
 
Y = Ayl + e (3) 
 
The OLS estimator of A v  is: A V = ((yl yl
'
)
1
pI ) vec(y), where A v = vec (A) 
 
 A = 1 , */)'( Tylyl  ,  M ,)'('
1
*
ylylylylITyl
   = yM yl y*/ T * ; T * = T- 
(k+d max ). 
 
MWALD test is given by: )()'()'( 1* vAvw RARRRAT
  has an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution with à J degree of freedom if  dkp  .  R is the matrix of dimension (J, q) and q = p (1+p 
(k+d max )) and if RA v =0. 
 
Rambaldi and Doran (1996) show that MWALD test can be determined in a VAR regression by the use 
SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions).  In this case, equation (3) can be written as follows: 
 
y
'''' eAyl   (4) 
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By performing the operator vec in equation (4), it becomes: 
 
vec (y
'
) = (I p  yl
'
) vec (A
'
) +vec(e
'
) (5) 
 
Let )( 'Avec , Y=vec (y )'  and u = vec(e ' ), in equation (5) will be as follows: 
 
Y= (I p )
'yl u  (6) 
 
E (uu )' = *TI  (7) 
 
Vector Y is the sum of T
*
 observations of y t  followed by T
*
 observations of y 2  etc…until T
*
of y p . 
Vector   is constituted of parameters of vector A v but with a different order.  Equations (6) and (7) are the 
components of SUR.  The covariance matrix of   is given by: 
 
  =   ((yl yl ' )/T * ) 1  (8) 
 
Let S a matrix with Sˆ =RA v , hence 
'SS  = R 'RA  
 
The coefficient w  is equivalent to (S
')ˆ (SV )ˆ())ˆ( 1'  SS  , therefore w  is the statistic of Wald pour 
le test des restrictions S =0. 
 
The advantage of this procedure is that it does not require knowledge of cointegration properties of the 
system.  This test can be done even if there is no cointegration and/or the stability and rank conditions are not 
satisfied (Zapta and Rambaldi, 1997).  Arithmetically, the trivariate framework of our case study can be expressed 
as follows: 
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where LGR is the logarithm of real general government revenues, LGE is the logarithm of real general government 
expenditures; LGDP is the logarithm of real gross domestic product.  Payne (1997) is the first who modeled 
government expenditure with gross domestic product for Canada and then for a panel of countries.  Narayan and 
Narayan (2006) have also used the same framework for a panel of developing countries and later Hamdi and Sbia 
(2013) for a panel of GCC countries. 
 
To summarize the theoretical framework, Toda-Yamamoto method is performed in two steps. The first step 
consists in determining the lag length (k) of VAR model and the maximum order of integration (d) of the time series 
variables in the system. After the selection of optimum lag length VAR (k) and the order of integration dmax, a level 
VAR is estimated with a total of [k+dmax] lags.  The second step requests the application the standard Wald tests on 
the first (k) VAR coefficient matrix to make Granger causal inference using a chi square (χ2) distribution. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical analysis is based on three steps.  Firstly, we determine the order of integration of the series 
(dmax) and the optimal lag length k.  To this end, we conduct Augmented Dickey–Fuller tests which will be 
confirmed by KPSS tests.  Secondly, we determine the optimal lag length the model using the sequential modified 
LR test statistic (LR), Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information 
criterion (SC), and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ).  The result of selecting optimal lag length of VAR 
indicates that lag order of VAR (k) is 2, for trivariate VAR.  Thirdly, we augment the VAR by the maximum order 
of integration of the series (dmax) and then we test for any misspecification to ensure that the classical regression 
assumptions were not violated. 
 
a. Unit Root Test: ADF and KPSS 
 
We test for stationarity of the data series before proceeding with the Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality 
test.  We employ an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the time series in levels and differenced forms.  Table 1 
reveals the results of the stationarity analysis. The results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit roots 
for all variables in level forms. However, the null hypothesis is rejected when the ADF test is applied to the first 
differences of each variable.  The first differences of the lnGDP, lnGR and lnGE, are stationary indicating that these 
variables are in fact integrated of order one, I(1). 
 
Further to the ADF tests, we employ the KPSS tests as indicated in table 1.  Results show that government 
revenues, government expenditures and real GDP are non-stationary in their levels.  These findings support those 
obtained from the ADF test. 
 
Table 1: Unit Root Test 
ADF 
Variables 
Greece Italy Ireland Spain Portugal 
Level 1stdiff Level 1stdiff Level 1stdiff Level 1stdiff Level 1stdiff 
LGR -2.08 -2.44 -2.18 -1.73 -1.53 -3.10 -3.07 -2.58 1.14 -10.13*** 
LGE -2.60 -4.88 *** -1.15 -4.77** 0.29 -6.62 *** 0.24 -1.70** -1.19 -2.33*** 
LGDP 1.15 1.04 -0.19 -1.26 0.09 -2.97 2.12 -0.45 -0.60 -2.97*** 
KPSS 
Variables 
Greece Italy Ireland Spain Portugal 
Level 1stdiff Level 1stdiff Level 1stdiff Level 1stdiff Level 1stdiff 
LGR 0.15** 0.35* 0.13* 0.08 0.15** 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.18** 0.50*** 
LGE 0.16** 0.50*** 0.16** 0.36*** 0.17** 0.49** 0.14* 0.13* 0.15** 0.16** 
LGDP 0.13* 0.17** 0.16** 0.46** 0.17** 0.10 0.17** 0.16** 0.16** 0.48 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
As our series are I(1), this means that, dmax=1. Further, the result of selecting optimal lag length of VAR 
indicates that lag order of VAR (k) is 2, for trivariate VAR.  Therefore, we can estimate a VAR system in levels 
with a total of dmax+k lags for each country. 
 
b. Toda-Yamamato Granger Causality Tests 
 
As we mentioned above, a multivariate Granger causality tests based on the Toda and Yamamato (1995) 
procedure provides valid inference in the context of unstable, possibly cointegrated systems (Hamdi 2013).  The 
results of these tests are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Toda and Yamamoto Results 
 Greece Italy Ireland Spain Portugal 
GE  => GR 19.84 (0.00)*** 0.96 (0.62) 00.34 (0.85) 00.07 (0.97) 9.73 (0.00)*** 
GDP => GR 01.83 (0.40) 3.39 (0.18) 00.72 (0.70) 11.52 (0.00)*** 2.32 (0.33) 
GR  => GE 00.31 (0.86) 2.95 (0.23) 16.04 (0.00)*** 45.38 (0.00)*** 50.66 (0.00)*** 
GDP => GE 00.44 (0.80) 0.08 (0.96) 02.90 (0.23) 90.55 (0.00)*** 07.72 (0.02)** 
GR=> GDP 00.90 (0.64) 8.32 (0.01)** 01.45 (0.49) 06.50 (0.03)** 1.11 (0.58) 
GE => GDP 18.20 (0.00)*** 0.61 (0.73) 00.56 (0.76) 17.47 (0.00)*** 2.04 (0.37) 
Notes: *** and ** indicate significance at 1 and 5 respectively. 
 
The results of Granger non-causality test due to Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure are presented in 
table 2 and can be interpreted as follows. First, the results are not identical for the five countries; this is because of 
the heterogeneity of the economy of these countries. 
 
Second, Portugal is the only country with a bidirectional relationship between the government revenue and 
government expenditure. This means that an increase in government expenditure rise government revenue and vice 
versa. Moreover, this implies that revenue and expenditure decisions are made independently in the 4 other 
countries. Furthermore, there is causal relationship running from GDP to government expenditure in Portugal. 
 
For Italy, there is a unique unidirectional causality running from government revenue to GDP while a 
unidirectional causal relationship is running from government revenue to government expenditure in Ireland; thus 
there is an evidence of spend and tax hypothesis. 
 
Turning now to Greece, results reveal a unidirectional relationship running from government expenditure to 
government revenue which support the ‘spend and tax hypothesis’ and another unidirectional causality running from 
government expenditure to GDP. The Greek fiscal policy based on expenditure is advantageous for the economy 
rather than another policy.  Based on these findings, we can say that the current reforms adopted by the government, 
which are based on austerity, are harmful for the Greek economy and they cannot be considered as the proper policy 
responses. 
 
Results for Spain reveal a bidirectional relationship between government revenue and GDP as well as 
bidirectional causality between government expenditure and GDP. This shows that an increase in revenue or in 
expenditure affects positively the output. Moreover, results show a unidirectional causal relationship between 
government revenue and government expenditure which support the tax-and-spend hypothesis suggested by 
Friedman (1978) and Buchanan and Wagner (1978). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This study has employed the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to determine the Granger no–causality 
tests between government revenues, government expenditures and growth for PIIGS countries.  The tests are based 
upon annual time series for the period of 1995-2009. Toda and Yamamoto causality test based on trivariate VAR 
model indicates bidirectional relationship between government revenues and government expenditures in Portugal 
only. Greece is the only countries (with Portugal) in which government expenditures granger cause government 
revenues. For Italy there is a unique unidirectional relationship running from government revenues to GDP while a 
unique unidirectional relationship is running from government revenues to expenditures for Ireland. Results for 
Spain show a double bidirectional relationship running from government revenue to GDP and from government 
expenditures to GDP.  Moreover, there exists a unidirectional causal relationship between government revenues and 
government expenditures. 
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